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An attack on the proactive RSA signature scheme in the URSA ad hoc network access control protocol
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Source Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks table of contents
Washington DC, USA
SESSION: Ad hoc networks table of contents
Pages: 1 - 9  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-972-1
Authors
Stanislaw Jarecki  UC Irvine, CA
Nitesh Saxena  UC Irvine, CA
Jeong Hyun Yi  UC Irvine, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 55,   Citation Count: 4
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ABSTRACT

Recently, Luo, et al. in a series of papers [17, 14, 13, 18, 15] proposed a set of protocols for providing ubiquitous and robust access control [URSA] in mobile ad hoc networks without relying on a centralized authority. The URSA protocol relies on the new proactive RSA signature scheme, which allows members in an ad hoc group to make access control decisions in a distributed manner. The proposed proactive RSA signature scheme is assumed secure as long as no more than an allowed threshold of participating members is simultaneously corrupted at any point in the lifetime of the scheme.

In this paper we show an attack on this proposed proactive RSA scheme, in which an admissible threshold of malicious group members can completely recover the group RSA secret key in the course of the lifetime of this scheme. Our attack stems from the fact that the threshold signature protocol which is a part of this proactive RSA scheme leaks some seemingly innocuous information about the secret signature key. We show how the corrupted members can in uence the execution of the scheme in such a way so that the slowly leaked information is used to reconstruct the entire shared secret.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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J. Blomer and A. May. New Partial Key Exposure Attacks on RSA. In D. Boneh, editor, CRYPTO '03, number 2729 in LNCS, pages 27--43. IACR, 2003.
 
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S. Jarecki and N. Saxena. Further Simplifications in Proactive RSA Signature Schemes. In submission. Draft available from the authors and on http: eprint.iacr.org. August 2004.
 
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J. Kong, H. Luo, K. Xu, D. L. Gu, M. Gerla, and S. Lu. Adaptive Security for Multi-level Ad-hoc Networks. In Journal of Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing (WCMC), volume 2, pages 533--547, 2002.
 
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Songwu Lu. Comments on Recent Advances in Cryptoanalysis of URSA. A draft communicated to the authors by email by Songwu Lu, on August 16th, 2004.
 
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H. Luo and S. Lu. Ubiquitous and Robust Authentication Services for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Technical Report TR-200030, Dept. of Computer Science, UCLA, 2000.
 
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N. Saxena, G. Tsudik, and J. H. Yi. Identity-based Access Control for Ad Hoc Groups. In Submission, September 2004.
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L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas. Securing Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE Network Magazine, 13(6):24--30, 1999.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Stanislaw Jarecki: colleagues
Nitesh Saxena: colleagues
Jeong Hyun Yi: colleagues