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Characteristics of internet background radiation
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Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement table of contents
Taormina, Sicily, Italy
SESSION: Traffic characterization table of contents
Pages: 27 - 40  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-821-0
Authors
Ruoming Pang  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Vinod Yegneswaran  University of Wisconsin at Madison
Paul Barford  University of Wisconsin at Madison
Vern Paxson  International Computer Science Institute, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
Larry Peterson  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Sponsors
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Monitoring any portion of the Internet address space reveals incessant activity. This holds even when monitoring traffic sent to unused addresses, which we term "background radiation. " Background radiation reflects fundamentally nonproductive traffic, either malicious (flooding backscatter, scans for vulnerabilities, worms) or benign (misconfigurations). While the general presence of background radiation is well known to the network operator community, its nature has yet to be broadly characterized. We develop such a characterization based on data collected from four unused networks in the Internet. Two key elements of our methodology are <i>(i)</i> the use of <i>filtering</i> to reduce load on the measurement system, and <i>(ii)</i> the use of <i>active responders</i> to elicit further activity from scanners in order to differentiate different types of background radiation. We break down the components of background radiation by protocol, application, and often specific exploit; analyze temporal patterns and correlated activity; and assess variations across different networks and over time. While we find a menagerie of activity, probes from worms and autorooters heavily dominate. We conclude with considerations of how to incorporate our characterizations into monitoring and detection activities.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  49

Collaborative Colleagues:
Ruoming Pang: colleagues
Vinod Yegneswaran: colleagues
Paul Barford: colleagues
Vern Paxson: colleagues
Larry Peterson: colleagues