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GridBox: securing hosts from malicious and greedy applications
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Source MGC; Vol. 76 archive
Proceedings of the 2nd workshop on Middleware for grid computing table of contents
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Pages: 17 - 22  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-950-0
Authors
Evgueni Dodonov  DC-UFSCar, Washington Luis, Sao Carlos (SP), Brazil
Joelle Quaini Sousa  DC-UFSCar, Washington Luis, Sao Carlos (SP), Brazil
Hélio Crestana Guardia  DC-UFSCar, Washington Luis, Sao Carlos (SP), Brazil
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Security is an important concern in providing the infrastructure for the implementation of general purpose computational grids. However, most grid implementations focus their security concerns in correctly authenticating users and hosts and in the communications among them. In most cases, application security is left to the underlying operating system. This can be a problem when a "malicious" application is executed.

In this work, we introduce the GridBox architecture, that aims to provide additional security for GRID applications, using Access Control Lists and sandbox functionality for GRID tasks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Evgueni Dodonov: colleagues
Joelle Quaini Sousa: colleagues
Hélio Crestana Guardia: colleagues