ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
HIDE: an infrastructure for efficiently protecting information leakage on the address bus
Full text PdfPdf (216 KB)
Source Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems archive
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems table of contents
Boston, MA, USA
SESSION: Security table of contents
Pages: 72 - 84  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-804-0
Also published in ...
Authors
Xiaotong Zhuang  Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
Tao Zhang  Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
Santosh Pande  Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
Sponsors
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
SIGARCH: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer Architecture
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 60,   Citation Count: 11
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1024393.1024403
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

XOM-based secure processor has recently been introduced as a mechanism to provide copy and tamper resistant execution. XOM provides support for encryption/decryption and integrity checking. However, neither XOM nor any other current approach adequately addresses the problem of information leakage via the address bus. This paper shows that without address bus protection, the XOM model is severely crippled. Two realistic attacks are shown and experiments show that 70% of the code might be cracked and sensitive data might be exposed leading to serious security breaches.Although the problem of address bus leakage has been widely acknowledged both in industry and academia, no practical solution has ever been proposed that can provide an adequate security guarantee. The main reason is that the problem is very difficult to solve in practice due to severe performance degradation which accompanies most of the solutions. This paper presents an infrastructure called HIDE (Hardware-support for leakage-Immune Dynamic Execution) which provides a solution consisting of chunk-level protection with hardware support and a flexible interface which can be orchestrated through the proposed compiler optimization and user specifications that allow utilizing underlying hardware solution more efficiently to provide better security guarantees.Our results show that protecting both data and code with a high level of security guarantee is possible with negligible performance penalty (1.3% slowdown).


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
6
 
7
 
8
M.Kuhn, "The TrustNo 1 Cryptoprocessor Concept," CS555 Report, Purdue Univ. 1997.
9
10
 
11
"DS5002FP secure microprocessor chip data sheet," Dallas Semiconductor.
12
 
13
VFLib Graph Matching Library, http://amalfi.dis.unina.it/ graph/db/vflib-2.0/doc/vflib-1.html
 
14
 
15
 
16
 
17
D.Burger, T.M.Austin. "The SimpleScalar Tool Set Version 2.0," TR. 1342, Univ. of Wisconsin--Madison, May 1997.
 
18
 
19
20
 
21
A.Huang, "Keeping Secrets in Hardware: the Microsoft Xbox (TM) Case Study," MIT TR. AIM-2002-008, May 26, 2002.
 
22
C. McClure, "Software Reuse Planning by Way of Domain Analysis," Technical Paper, Extended Intelligence, Inc. http://www.reusability.com.
 
23
24
25

CITED BY  11

Collaborative Colleagues:
Xiaotong Zhuang: colleagues
Tao Zhang: colleagues
Santosh Pande: colleagues