| HIDE: an infrastructure for efficiently protecting information leakage on the address bus |
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Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems
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Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
table of contents
Boston, MA, USA
SESSION: Security
table of contents
Pages: 72 - 84
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-804-0
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3, Downloads (12 Months): 60, Citation Count: 11
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ABSTRACT
XOM-based secure processor has recently been introduced as a mechanism to provide copy and tamper resistant execution. XOM provides support for encryption/decryption and integrity checking. However, neither XOM nor any other current approach adequately addresses the problem of information leakage via the address bus. This paper shows that without address bus protection, the XOM model is severely crippled. Two realistic attacks are shown and experiments show that 70% of the code might be cracked and sensitive data might be exposed leading to serious security breaches.Although the problem of address bus leakage has been widely acknowledged both in industry and academia, no practical solution has ever been proposed that can provide an adequate security guarantee. The main reason is that the problem is very difficult to solve in practice due to severe performance degradation which accompanies most of the solutions. This paper presents an infrastructure called HIDE (Hardware-support for leakage-Immune Dynamic Execution) which provides a solution consisting of chunk-level protection with hardware support and a flexible interface which can be orchestrated through the proposed compiler optimization and user specifications that allow utilizing underlying hardware solution more efficiently to provide better security guarantees.Our results show that protecting both data and code with a high level of security guarantee is possible with negligible performance penalty (1.3% slowdown).
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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CITED BY 11
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Xiaotong Zhuang , Tao Zhang , Hsien-Hsin S. Lee , Santosh Pande, Hardware assisted control flow obfuscation for embedded processors, Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Compilers, architecture, and synthesis for embedded systems, September 22-25, 2004, Washington DC, USA
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Guy Gogniat , Tilman Wolf , Wayne Burleson , Jean-Philippe Diguet , Lilian Bossuet , Romain Vaslin, Reconfigurable hardware for high-security/high-performance embedded systems: the SAFES perspective, IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, v.16 n.2, p.144-154, February 2008
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Lan Gao , Jun Yang , Marek Chrobak , Youtao Zhang , San Nguyen , Hsien-Hsin S. Lee, A low-cost memory remapping scheme for address bus protection, Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Parallel architectures and compilation techniques, September 16-20, 2006, Seattle, Washington, USA
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