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Denial of service resilience in ad hoc networks
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Source International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking archive
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking table of contents
Philadelphia, PA, USA
SESSION: Ad hoc networks table of contents
Pages: 202 - 215  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-868-7
Authors
Imad Aad  Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
Jean-Pierre Hubaux  Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
Edward W. Knightly  Rice University, Houston, TX
Sponsors
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 30,   Downloads (12 Months): 147,   Citation Count: 20
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ABSTRACT

Significant progress has been made towards making ad hoc networks secure and DoS resilient. However, little attention has been focused on quantifying DoS resilience: Do ad hoc networks have sufficiently redundant paths and counter-DoS mechanisms to make DoS attacks largely ineffective? Or are there attack and system factors that can lead to devastating effects? In this paper, we design and study DoS attacks in order to assess the damage that difficult-to-detect attackers can cause. The first attack we study, called the JellyFish attack, is targeted against closed-loop flows such as TCP; although protocol compliant, it has devastating effects. The second is the Black Hole attack, which has effects similar to the JellyFish, but on open-loop flows. We quantify via simulations and analytical modeling the scalability of DoS attacks as a function of key performance parameters such as mobility, system size, node density, and counter-DoS strategy. One perhaps surprising result is that such DoS attacks can increase the capacity of ad hoc networks, as they starve multi-hop flows and only allow one-hop communication, a capacity-maximizing, yet clearly undesirable situation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  20

Collaborative Colleagues:
Imad Aad: colleagues
Jean-Pierre Hubaux: colleagues
Edward W. Knightly: colleagues