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Statistics and secret leakage
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Source ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS) archive
Volume 3 ,  Issue 3  (August 2004) table of contents
Pages: 492 - 508  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISSN:1539-9087
Authors
Jean-Sebastien Coron  Gemplus, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
David Naccache  Gemplus, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
Paul Kocher  Cryptography Research, Inc., San Francisco, CA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical channels.This paper gives a rigorous definition of leakage immunity and presents several leakage detection tests. In these tests, failure confirms the probable existence of secret-correlated emanations and indicates how likely the leakage is. Success does not refute the existence of emanations but indicates that significant emanations were not detected on the strength of the evidence presented, which of course, leaves the door open to reconsider the situation if further evidence comes to hand at a later date.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  7

Collaborative Colleagues:
Jean-Sebastien Coron: colleagues
David Naccache: colleagues
Paul Kocher: colleagues