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Asynchronous group key exchange with failures
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada
SESSION: Failure detectors table of contents
Pages: 357 - 366  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-802-4
Authors
Christian Cachin  IBM Research, Rüschlikon, Switzerland
Reto Strobl  IBM Research, Rüschlikon, Switzerland
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 24,   Citation Count: 5
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ABSTRACT

Group key exchange protocols allow a group of servers communicating over an asynchronous network of point-to-point links to establish a common key, such that an adversary which fully controls the network links (but not the group members) cannot learn the key. Currently known group key exchange protocols rely on the assumption that all group members participate in the protocol and if a single server crashes, then no server may terminate the protocol. In this paper, we propose the first purely asynchronous group key exchange protocol that tolerates a minority of servers to crash. Our solution uses a constant number of rounds, which makes it suitable for use in practice. Furthermore, we also investigate how to provide forward secrecy with respect to an adversary that may break into some servers and observe their internal state. We show that any group key exchange protocol among n servers that tolerates tc > 0 servers to crash can only provide forward secrecy if the adversary breaks into less than n - 2tc servers, and propose a group key exchange protocol that achieves this bound.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Christian Cachin: colleagues
Reto Strobl: colleagues