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The random oracle methodology, revisited
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Journal of the ACM (JACM) archive
Volume 51 ,  Issue 4  (July 2004) table of contents
Pages: 557 - 594  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISSN:0004-5411
Authors
Ran Canetti  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, New York
Oded Goldreich  Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Shai Halevi  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, New York
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions".The main result of this article is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  12

Collaborative Colleagues:
Ran Canetti: colleagues
Oded Goldreich: colleagues
Shai Halevi: colleagues