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The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
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Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Chicago, IL, USA
SESSION: Session 17B table of contents
Pages: 604 - 612  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-852-0
Authors
Alex Fabrikant  UC Berkeley, CA
Christos Papadimitriou  UC Berkeley, CA
Kunal Talwar  UC Berkeley, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 25,   Downloads (12 Months): 192,   Citation Count: 49
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ABSTRACT

We investigate from the computational viewpoint multi-player games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLS-complete in general. We discuss implications to non-atomic congestion games, and we explore the scope of the potential function method for proving existence of pure Nash equilibria.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  49


REVIEW

"William A Fahle : Reviewer"

A relatively new research area in theoretical computer science, at the intersection of game theory and computer science, is brought to light in this paper. The problem of computing pure Nash equilibria (PNE) is discussed, and specific cases of con  more...

Collaborative Colleagues:
Alex Fabrikant: colleagues
Christos Papadimitriou: colleagues
Kunal Talwar: colleagues