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New notions of security: achieving universal composability without trusted setup
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Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Chicago, IL, USA
SESSION: Session 7A table of contents
Pages: 242 - 251  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-852-0
Authors
Manoj Prabhakaran  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Amit Sahai  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 6,   Downloads (12 Months): 50,   Citation Count: 6
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ABSTRACT

We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new notion involves comparing the real protocol execution with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [3] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Boaz Barak and Yehuda Lindell. Strict Polynomial-time in Simulation and Extraction. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC)(026): (2002)
 
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R. Canetti, E. Kushilevitz, and Y. Lindell. On the limitations of universally composable two-party computation without set-up assumptions. In EUROCRYPT, pages 68--86, 2003.
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Secure Multi-Party Computation. Manuscript. Preliminary version, 1998. Available from: http://www. wisdom. weizmann. ac. il/ oded/pp. html.
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Moni Naor. Bit Commitment using Pseudorandom Generators. Journal of Cryptology, 4(2):151--158, 1991.
 
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Rafael Pass. Simulation in Quasi-Polynomial Time, and Its Application to Protocol Composition. EUROCRYPT 2003: 160--176.
 
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Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai. New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup. At the Cryptology ePrint Archive http://eprint. iacr. org/. 2004.
 
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Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai. Revisiting Concurrency: Monitored Functionalities and Client-Server Computation. Manuscript under preparation.
 
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Ransom Richardson and Joe Kilian. On the Concurrent Composition of Zero-Knowledge Proofs. EUROCRYPT 1999: 415--431
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Manoj Prabhakaran: colleagues
Amit Sahai: colleagues