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Team formation and communication restrictions in collectives
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents
Melbourne, Australia
POSTER SESSION: Posters table of contents
Pages: 916 - 917  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-683-8
Authors
Adrian K. Agogino  The University of Texas, Austin, TX
Kagan Tumer  NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA
Sponsors
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A collective of agents often needs to maximize a "world utility" function which rates the performance of an entire system, while subject to communication restrictions among the agents. Such communication restrictions make it difficult for agents which try to pursue their own "private" utilities to take actions that also help optimize the world utility. Team formation presents a solution to this problem, where by joining other agents, an agent can significantly increase its knowledge about the environment and improve its chances of both optimizing its own utility and that its doing so will contribute to the world utility. In this article we show how utilities that have been previously shown to be effective in collectives can be modified to be more effective in domains with moderate communication restrictions resulting in performance improvements of up to 75%. Additionally we show that even severe communication constraints can be overcome by forming teams where each agent of a team shares the same utility, increasing performance an additional 25%. We show that utilities and team sizes can be manipulated to form the best compromise between how "aligned" an agent's utility is with the world utility and how easily an agent can learn that utility.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
J. Fredslund and M. J Mataric. Robots in formation using local information. In Proc. IAS-7, March 2002.
 
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4
D. H. Wolpert and K. Tumer. Optimal payoff functions for members of collectives. Advances in Complex Systems, 4(2/3):265--279, 2001.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Adrian K. Agogino: colleagues
Kagan Tumer: colleagues

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