ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
A comment on the confinement problem
Full text PdfPdf (436 KB)
Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Austin, Texas, United States
Pages: 192 - 196  
Year of Publication: 1975
Also published in ...
Author
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 12,   Downloads (12 Months): 100,   Citation Count: 17
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues   peer to peer  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/800213.806537
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

The confinement problem, as identified by Lampson, is the problem of assuring that a borrowed program does not steal for its author information that it processes for a borrower. An approach to proving that an operating system enforces confinement, by preventing borrowed programs from writing information in storage in violation of a formally stated security policy, is presented. The confinement problem presented by the possibility that a borrowed program will modulate its resource usage to transmit information to its author is also considered. This problem is manifest by covert channels associated with the perception of time by the program and its author; a scheme for closing such channels is suggested. The practical implications of the scheme are discussed.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Bell, D. Elliott and LaPadula, Leonard J. Secure computer systems. ESD-TR-73-278 (AD 770768, 771543, and 780528) The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts (November 1973).
 
2
Burke, Edmund L. Private communication—Burke and Schell seem to have devised the scheme of applying the *-property to variables inside a security kernel during late 1972 or early 1973.
 
3
Honeywell Information Systems. Design for Multics security enhancements. ESD-TR-74-176, Electronic Systems Division (AFSC), L. G. Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts (1974).
4
 
5
Millen, Jonathan K. Security kernel validation in practice. MTR-2932, Vol. 2, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts (In preparation).
 
6
7
 
8
9
 
10
Rotenberg, Leo J. Making computers keep secrets. MAC-TR-115, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts (February 1974).
 
11
Saltzer, Jerome H. Private communication. (April 1975).
 
12
Schell, Roger R. See reference {2}.
 
13
Schiller, W. Lee. Design of a security kernel for the PDP-11/45. ESD-TR-73-294 (AD 772808), The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts (December 1973).
 
14
Schiller, W. Lee. The design and specification of a security kernel for the PDP-11/45. ESD-TR-75-69 (AD A011712), The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts (March 1975).
 
15
Weissman, Clark. Security controls in the ADEPT-50 time-sharing system. AFIPS Conference Proceedings 35 (FJCC 1969) 119-133.

CITED BY  17
 
 
 
 
 
 


Peer to Peer - Readers of this Article have also read: