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Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
San Diego, CA, USA
POSTER SESSION: Poster paper sessions table of contents
Pages: 220 - 221  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-679-X
Author
Felix Brandt  Technical University of Munich, Germany
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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[1] F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In Proc. of the 7th International Conference on Financial Cryptography, Springer LNCS, 2003.
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