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An algebra for composing access control policies
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Source ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 5 ,  Issue 1  (February 2002) table of contents
Pages: 1 - 35  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Piero Bonatti  Università di Milano, Crema, Italy
Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati  Università di Brescia, Brescia, Italy
Pierangela Samarati  Università di Milano, Crema, Italy
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Despite considerable advancements in the area of access control and authorization languages, current approaches to enforcing access control are all based on monolithic and complete specifications. This assumption is too restrictive when access control restrictions to be enforced come from the combination of different policy specifications, each possibly under the control of independent authorities, and where the specifics of some component policies may not even be known apriori. Turning individual specifications into a coherent policy to be fed into the access control system requires a nontrivial combination and translation process. This article addresses the problem of combining authorization specifications that may be independently stated, possibly in different languages and according to different policies. We propose an algebra of security policies together with its formal semantics and illustrate how to formulate complex policies in the algebra and reason about them. A translation of policy expressions into equivalent logic programs is illustrated, which provides the basis for the implementation of the algebra. The algebra's expressiveness is analyzed through a comparison with first-order logic.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY  18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Collaborative Colleagues:
Piero Bonatti: colleagues
Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati: colleagues
Pierangela Samarati: colleagues

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