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Selective private function evaluation with applications to private statistics
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Newport, Rhode Island, United States
Pages: 293 - 304  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-383-9
Authors
Ran Canetti  IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Hawthorne, NY
Yuval Ishai  DIMACS Center, Piscataway, NJ; and AT&T Labs-Research, Florham Park, NJ
Ravi Kumar  IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose, CA
Michael K. Reiter  Bell Labs., Murray Hill, NJ
Ronitt Rubinfeld  NEC Research Institute, Princeton, NJ
Rebecca N. Wright  AT&T Labs-Research, Florham Park, NJ
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Motivated by the application of private statistical analysis of large databases, we consider the problem of selective private function evaluation (SPFE). In this problem, a client interacts with one or more servers holding copies of a database x = x1, … , xn in order to compute f(xi1, … , xim), for some function f and indices i = i1, … , im chosen by the client. Ideally, the client must learn nothing more about the database than f(xi, … , xim), and the servers should learn nothing.

Generic solutions for this problem, based on standard techniques for secure function evaluation, incur communication complexity that is at least linear in n, making them prohibitive for large databases even when f in relatively simple and m is small. We present various approaches for constructing sublinear-communication SPFE protocols, both for the general problem and for special cases of interest. Our solutions not only offer sublinear communication complexity, but are also practical in many scenarios.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  11
 
 
 

Collaborative Colleagues:
Ran Canetti: colleagues
Yuval Ishai: colleagues
Ravi Kumar: colleagues
Michael K. Reiter: colleagues
Ronitt Rubinfeld: colleagues
Rebecca N. Wright: colleagues

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