Evaluating system integrity

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Evaluating system integrity

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New Security Paradigms Workshop archive
Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms table of contents

Charlottesville, Virginia, United States

Pages: 40 - 47

Year of Publication: 1998

ISBN:1-58113-168-2

Author

Simon N. Foley

Department of Computer Science, University College, Cork, Ireland and Centre for Communications Systems Research, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3DS, UK

Sponsor

SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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