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A key distribution method for object-based protection
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Fairfax, Virginia, United States
Pages: 193 - 197  
Year of Publication: 1994
ISBN:0-89791-732-4
Authors
Warwick Ford  Bell-Northern Research, Ottawa, Canada
Michael J. Wiener  Bell-Northern Research, Ottawa, Canada
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 22,   Citation Count: 1
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ABSTRACT

In any scheme for protecting the confidentiality of data, selecting a key and encrypting the data is the easy part. The difficult part is controlling access to decryption keys. This becomes particularly significant with object-based protection, that is protection of an object, such as a file or a message, regardless of where the object is currently being stored or transferred within a distributed environment. An example of object-based protection is traditional electronic mail encryption, where access control amounts to selecting a list of individuals permitted to decrypt a message and attaching copies of the symmetric encryption key, encrypted using their public keys, to the encrypted message content. We present a different means of controlling access to decryption keys which can support more flexible access control rules and can better reflect security policy. It is particularly suitable for use in such data distribution environments as public file servers, bulletin boards, commercial information dissemination services, and groupware applications. Because all participants need to trust central servers, the method is less suitable for loosely-connected groups than for medium to large commercial or government organizations.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
DIF1
W. Diffie and M. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 1T-22, no. 6 (1976), pp. 644-654.
 
ECM1
European Computer Manufacturers Association, Security in Open Systems ~ A Security Framework, Technical Report ECMA TR/46, July 1988.
 
ISO1
ISO/IEC and ITU, Information Technology Message Handling Systems, ISO/IEC 10021 International Standard and ITU CCITT X.400 series Recommendations, 1988.
 
KOH1
J.T. Kohl and B.C. Neuman, The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5), Internet Request for Comments (RFC) 1510, Intemet Activities Board, U.S.A., 1993.
 
LIN1
J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for lnternet Electronic Mail, Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures, Request for Comments (RFC) 1421, Internet Activities Board, U.S.A., 1993.
RIV1


Collaborative Colleagues:
Warwick Ford: colleagues
Michael J. Wiener: colleagues

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