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An empirical evaluation of entropy-based traffic anomaly detection
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Internet Measurement Conference archive
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement table of contents
Vouliagmeni, Greece
SESSION: Internet coordinates and anomaly detection table of contents
Pages 151-156  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-334-1
Authors
George Nychis  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Vyas Sekar  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
David G. Andersen  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Hyong Kim  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Hui Zhang  Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Sponsors
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
SIGMETRICS: ACM Special Interest Group on Measurement and Evaluation
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Entropy-based approaches for anomaly detection are appealing since they provide more fine-grained insights than traditional traffic volume analysis. While previous work has demonstrated the benefits of entropy-based anomaly detection, there has been little effort to comprehensively understand the detection power of using entropy-based analysis of multiple traffic distributions in conjunction with each other. We consider two classes of distributions: flow-header features (IP addresses, ports, and flow-sizes), and behavioral features (degree distributions measuring the number of distinct destination/source IPs that each host communicates with). We observe that the timeseries of entropy values of the address and port distributions are strongly correlated with each other and provide very similar anomaly detection capabilities. The behavioral and flow size distributions are less correlated and detect incidents that do not show up as anomalies in the port and address distributions. Further analysis using synthetically generated anomalies also suggests that the port and address distributions have limited utility in detecting scan and bandwidth flood anomalies. Based on our analysis, we discuss important implications for entropy-based anomaly detection.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Nychis, G., Sekar, V., Andersen, D. G., Kim, H., and Zhang, H. An Empirical Evaluation of Entropy-Based Traffic Anomaly Detection. Tech. Rep. CMU-CS-08-145, Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, 2008.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
George Nychis: colleagues
Vyas Sekar: colleagues
David G. Andersen: colleagues
Hyong Kim: colleagues
Hui Zhang: colleagues