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Information flow security of multi-threaded distributed programs
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Programming languages and analysis for security archive
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security table of contents
Tucson, AZ, USA
SESSION: Information-flow security table of contents
Pages 113-124  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-936-4
Authors
Riccardo Focardi  Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia, Venice, Italy
Matteo Centenaro  Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia, Venice, Italy
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We study noninterference in the setting of multi-threaded distributed programs in which threads share local memories and multi-threaded processes communicate over an insecure network using encryption primitives to secure messages. We extend a simple imperative language with cryptographic operations which are modelled as special expressions respecting the Dolev-Yao assumptions. Then, we adapt to our setting the notion of patterns proposed by Abadi and Rogaway for modelling the equivalence of cryptographic expressions. Based on this notion, we naturally obtain a definition of strongly secure programs corresponding to the one proposed by Sabelfeld and Sands for programs without cryptography. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first definition of noninterference in a multi-threaded distributed setting, with insecure channels and cryptography. We prove compositionality of secure programs and we adapt the type system of Sabelfeld and Sands to our setting, proving its correctness.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Aslan Askarov, Daniel Hedin, and Andrei Sabelfeld. Cryptographically-masked flows. In Proceedings of the International Static Analysis Symposium, Seoul, Korea, August 2006. Springer-Verlag.
 
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Matteo Centenaro and Riccardo Focardi. Information flow security of multi-threaded distributed programs (full version). http://www.dsi.unive.it/~mcentena/centenaro-focardi.pdf, 2008.
 
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Tom Chothia, Dominic Duggan, and Jan Vitek. Type-based distributed access control. In Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW?03), Asilomar, CA, USA, July 2003.
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Andrei Sabelfeld and Heiko Mantel. Static confidentiality enforcement for distributed programs. In Proceeding of the 9th International Static Analysis Symposium, volume 2477, Madrid, Spain, September 2002. Springer.
 
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Andrei Sabelfeld and Andrew C. Myers. Language-based information-flow security. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 21(1), January 2003.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Riccardo Focardi: colleagues
Matteo Centenaro: colleagues