Auctioning or assigning an object

Subscribe (Full Service)


	Search: The ACM Digital Library The Guide

	Feedback

Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms

Full text

Pdf (167 KB)

Source

ACM SIGecom Exchanges archive
Volume 7 , Issue 1 (December 2007) table of contents

Pages 37-42

Year of Publication: 2007

Author

Hervé Moulin

Rice University

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 3, Downloads (12 Months): 17, Citation Count: 0

Additional Information:

references index terms collaborative colleagues

Tools and Actions:	Review this Article Save this Article to a Binder Display Formats: BibTeX EndNote ACM Ref

DOI Bookmark:	Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1345037.1345046 What is a DOI?

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	M. Atlamaz and D. Yengin, Fair Groves mechanisms, mimeo, Rochester University, 2006.
	2	M.J. Bailey, The demand revealing process: to distribute the surplus, Public Choice, 91:107-126, 1997.
	3	Ruggiero Cavallo, Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments, Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, May 08-12, 2006, Hakodate, Japan [doi>10.1145/1160633.1160790]
	4	P. Cramton, R. Gibbons and P. Klemperer, Dissolving a partnership efficiently, Econometrica, 55, 3, 615-632, 1987.
	5	Mingyu Guo , Vincent Conitzer, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments, Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 11-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA [doi>10.1145/1250910.1250915]
	6	M. Guo and V. Conitzer, Worst case optimal redistribution of VCG payments (extended version)
	7	J. Green, and J.J. Laffont, Incentives in public decision making, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979.
	8	H. Kunreuther, The Role of Compensation in Siting Hazardous Facilities, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, September 1996.
	9	H. Moulin, Characterizations of the Pivotal Mechanism, Journal of Public Economics, 31, 53-78, 1986.
	10	H. Moulin, An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money, Econometrica, 60, 6, 1331-1349, 1992.
	11	H. Moulin, Efficient, strategy-proof and almost budget-balanced assignment, www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/faculty/Moulin/spassgnt.pdf
	12	H. Moulin, Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms, www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/faculty/Moulin/auctass1obj.pdf
	13	R. Porter, Y. Shoham and M. Tennenholtz, Fair imposition, Journal of Economic Theory, 118, 209-228, 2004.