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Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design

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ACM SIGecom Exchanges archive
Volume 7 , Issue 1 (December 2007) table of contents

Pages 25-29

Year of Publication: 2007

Author

Ron Lavi

Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, The Technion, Israel

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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REFERENCES

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	3	Yair Bartal , Rica Gonen , Noam Nisan, Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, June 20-22, 2003, Univerity of Indiana, Indiana [doi>10.1145/846241.846250]
	4	BIKHCHANDANI, S., CHATTERJEE, S., LAVI, R., MU'ALEM, A., NISAN, N., AND SEN, A. 2006. Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation. Econometrica 74(4), 1109-1132.
	5	CHRISTODOULOU, G., KOUTSOUPIAS, E., AND KOVÁCS, A. 2007. Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines. In The Proc. of the 34th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP).
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	14	LAVI, R., MU'ALEM, A., AND NISAN, N. 2007. An impossibility result for ex-post implementable multi-item auctions with private values. Manuscript.
	15	Ron Lavi , Chaitanya Swamy, Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming, Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, p.595-604, October 23-25, 2005 [doi>10.1109/SFCS.2005.76]
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