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Decentralized task allocation using magnet: an empirical evaluation in the logistics domain
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ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 258 archive
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Minneapolis, MN, USA
SESSION: Session T6: mechanisms and institutions II table of contents
Pages: 319 - 328  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-700-1
Authors
Mark Hoogendoorn  Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Maria L. Gini  University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN
Catholijn M. Jonker  Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
Sponsors
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a decentralized task allocation method that can handle allocation of tasks with time and precedence constraints in a multi-agent setting where not all information needed for a centralized approach is shared.

In our MAGNET-based approach agents distribute tasks via first-price reverse combinatorial auctions, where the auctioneer is whatever agent has tasks to be allocated. The choice of MAGNET is based on its uniqueness to handle auctions for allocation of tasks which include time windows and precedence constraints.

Empirical evaluations based on real data obtained from a logistics company show that the system performs well. The costs of the allocations obtained by our approach are on average within 5% from the optimal allocation. The computation time is linear in the number of tasks, while computing the optimal allocation is an NP-hard problem.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Mark Hoogendoorn: colleagues
Maria L. Gini: colleagues
Catholijn M. Jonker: colleagues