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Rendezvous-based access control for medical records in the pre-hospital environment
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International Conference On Mobile Systems, Applications And Services archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGMOBILE international workshop on Systems and networking support for healthcare and assisted living environments table of contents
San Juan, Puerto Rico
SESSION: Access and security table of contents
Pages: 1 - 6  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-767-4
Authors
Feike W. Dillema  University of Tromsø
Simone Lupetti  University of Tromsø
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present rendezvous-based access control for access control in the pre-hospital environment. Rendezvous-based access control is a simple cryptographic access control method that provides access if and only if patient and health worker meet in the physical world. Access is provided locally and does not depend on connectivity with remote systems. It is therefore suitable in an environment with small mobile devices that have local connectivity but may be disconnected now and then from remote systems. It is designed to protect against aggregation threats without letting the patients carry their own medical data. A system can then be implemented where the tokens carried by the patients are simple and robust which is easily managed. We believe that our mechanism provides a useful alternative to remote access to a centralized system and to patients carrying their own medical record (on a smartcard e.g.).


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Feike W. Dillema: colleagues
Simone Lupetti: colleagues