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Computing the communication costs of item allocation
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents
The Netherlands
SESSION: Posters: voting table of contents
Pages: 1205 - 1206  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-093-0
Authors
Timothy W. Rauenbusch  SRI International, Menlo Park, CA
Stuart M. Shieber  Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Barbara J. Grosz  Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Multiagent systems require techniques for effectively allocating resources or tasks among agents in a group. Auctions are one method for structuring communication of agents' private values for the resource or task to a central decision maker. Different auction methods vary in their communication requirements. This work makes three contributions to the understanding the types of group decision making for which auctions are appropriate methods. First, it shows that entropy is the best measure of communication bandwidth used by an auction in messages bidders send and receive. Second, it presents a method for measuring bandwidth usage; the dialogue trees used for this computation are a new and compact representation of the probability distribution of every possible dialogue between two agents. Third, it presents new guidelines for choosing the best auction, guidelines which differ significantly from recommendations in prior work. The new guidelines are based on detailed analysis of the communication requirements of Sealed-bid, Dutch, Staged, Japanese, and Bisection auctions. In contradistinction to previous work, the guidelines show that the auction that minimizes bandwidth depends on both the number of bidders and the sample space from which bidders' valuations are drawn.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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E. Grigorieva, P. J.-J. Herings, R. Müller, and D. Vermeulen. The private value single item bisection auction. In METEOR Research Memoranda, number RM/02/035. Maastricht University, 2002.
 
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C. E. Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27, 1948.
 
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Y. Shoham and M. Tennenholtz. Rational computation and the communication complexity of auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 35(1--2):197--211, 2001.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Timothy W. Rauenbusch: colleagues
Stuart M. Shieber: colleagues
Barbara J. Grosz: colleagues