Towards a formal model for task allocation via coalition formation

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Towards a formal model for task allocation via coalition formation

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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents

The Netherlands

SESSION: Posters: cooperation II table of contents

Pages: 1185 - 1186

Year of Publication: 2005

ISBN:1-59593-093-0

Author

Leila Amgoud

IRIT - CNRS, route de Narbonne, Toulouse, France

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 1, Downloads (12 Months): 21, Citation Count: 1

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the problem of generating coalition structures for task allocation via coalition formation. It provides a unified formal framework for constructing those coalitions structures. The framework takes as input a set of coalitions whose structures are abstract, a conflict relation between the coalitions, and a preference relation between the coalitions and returns the coalitions structures. Three semantics for coalitions structures will be proposed: a basic semantics which will return a unique coalition structure, stable semantics and preferred semantics. These two last may return several coalitions structures at the same time.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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